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Abstract
Using a standard Hotelling model of resource exploitation, we determine
the optimal consumption paths of three energy resources: dirty coal, which
is depletable and carbon-emitting; clean coal, which is also depletable but
carbon-free thanks to an abatement technology (CCS: Carbon Capture and
Storage), and solar energy which is renewable and carbon-free. Carbon emis-
sions are released into the atmosphere and we assume that the atmospheric
carbon stock cannot exceed a given ceiling. We consider learning-by-doing
in the abatement technology, implying that the marginal CCS cost is de-
creasing in the cumulative consumption of clean coal. We show the following
results. i) Learning-by-doing does not imply "early" capture, i.e. the clean
coal exploitation must begin at the earliest once the carbon cap is reached.
ii) The energy price path can evolve non-monotonically over time. iii) When
the solar cost is low enough, there may exist unusual energy consumption
sequence along which solar energy is interrupted for some time and replaced
by clean coal.
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Storage; Learning-by-doing
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1 Introduction
Carbon dioxide capture and storage (CCS) is a process consisting of the separation of CO2
from the emissions stream from fossil fuel combustion, transporting it to storage location,
and storing it in a manner that ensures its long-run isolation from the atmosphere (IPCC,
2005). Currently, the major CCS effort focuses on the removal of CO2 directly from
industrial or utility plants and storing it in secure geological reservoirs. Given that fossil
fuels supply over 85% of all primary energy demands, CCS appears as the only technology
that can substantially reduce CO2 emissions while allowing fossil fuels to meet the world's
pressing needs (Herzog, 2011). Moreover, CCS technology may have considerable potential
to reduce CO2 at a "reasonable" social cost, given the social costs of carbon emissions
predicted for a business-as-usual scenario (Islegen and Reichelstein, 2009). According to
Hamilton et al. (2009), the mitigation cost for capture and compression of the emissions
from power plants running with gas is about $52 per metric ton CO2. Adding the transport
and storage costs1 in a range of $5-15 per metric ton CO2, a carbon price of about $60-65
per metric ton CO2 is needed to make these plants competitive.
This CCS technology has motivated a large number of empirical studies, mainly de-
veloping complex integrated assessment models (e.g. Edenhofer et al., 2005, Gerlagh and
van der Zwaan, 2006, Grimaud et al., 2011, McFarland et al., 2003). In these models,
the motivation for using CCS technologies is to reduce CO2 emissions
2 and, in this sense,
climate policies are essential to create a significant market for these technologies. These
empirical models generally conclude that an early introduction of sequestration can lead
to a substantial decrease in the social cost of climate change. However a high level of
complexity for such models, aimed at defining some specific climate policies and energy
scenarios, may be required so as to take into account the various interactions at the hand.
The theoretical economic literature on CCS is more succinct. For instance, Lafforgue
et al. (2008-a) characterize the optimal CCS policy in a model of energy substitution
when carbon emissions can be stockpiled into several reservoirs of finite size. Ayong Le
kama et al. (2013) develop a growth model aiming at exhibiting the main driving forces
that determine the optimal CCS policy when the command variable of such a policy is the
sequestration rate instead of the sequestration flow. Grimaud and Rouge (2009) study the
1As explained in Hamilton et al. (2009), the transport and storage costs are very site specific.
2As mentioned by Herzog (2009), the idea of separating and capturing CO2 from the flue gas of power
plants did not originate out of concern about climate change. The first commercial CCS plants that have
been built in the late 1970s in the United States to achieve enhanced oil recovery (EOR) operations, where
CO2 is injected into oil reservoirs to increase the pressure and thus the output of the reservoir.
2
implications of the CCS technology availability on the optimal use of polluting exhaustible
resources and on optimal climate policies within an endogenous growth model. However,
the outcomes of these models cannot be easily compared since they strongly vary according
to the properties of the environmental damage and abatement cost functions. In the case
where a carbon stabilization cap is considered instead of a standard damage function, i.e.
under a cap-and-trade approach, the crucial question of the timing of the CCS policy arises.
In particular, is it optimal to wait for being constrained by this carbon cap before starting
sequestration, or not? Assuming a carbon ceiling constraint and a constant average CCS
cost, Lafforgue et al. (2008-a)3 conclude that, for any storage capacity, it is never optimal
to deploy CCS before the atmospheric carbon cap is attained. Using the same type of
"ceiling model", Amigues et al. show that an "earlier" CCS development  that is before
the constraining ceiling is reached  can be induced by assuming heterogeneity in carbon
emitters regarding the cost of the abatement technology they have access to (Amigues et
al. 2013-a), or by assuming decreasing returns to scale in the CCS technology (Amigues
et al. 2013-b).
In the present study, we address the question of the qualitative impacts of learning-
by-doing in the CCS technology on the optimal timing of the abatement policy. Since, as
pointed out by Gerlagh (2006) or by Manne and Richels (2004), the cumulative experience
in carbon capture generates in most cases some beneficial learning tending to reduce the
involved costs, the average cost function may be decreasing in the cumulative sequestration.
When such a learning-by-doing process is considered, the intuition would suggest that CCS
may be deployed as soon as possible to benefit from this learning. To check this point,
we extend the model of Lafforgue et al. (2008-a) in which the marginal sequestration cost
is constant, by assuming that this cost is decreasing in the cumulative abatement, and
we characterize the optimal time profiles of the energy price, the energy consumption, the
carbon emissions and the flow of abatement within this new framework.
The sketch of the model is the following. The energy needs can be supplied by three
types of energy resources that are perfect substitutes. The first resource is non-renewable
and carbon-emitting (dirty coal), the second resource is also non-renewable but carbon-
free thanks to a CCS device (clean coal) and the last resource is renewable and clean
(solar energy). Hence, we consider two alternative mitigation options allowing to relax
the carbon cap constraint: the exploitation of the solar energy and of the clean coal. The
3Note that this kind of Hotelling model of fossil resource extraction with a critical threshold that the
atmospheric carbon stock should not exceed has been pioneered by Chakravorty et al. (2006).
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design of the optimal energy consumption path thus results from the comparison of the
respective marginal costs of these three energy sources. Both the marginal extraction cost
of coal and the marginal production cost of the solar energy are assumed to be constant,
the former been lower than the later. However, producing clean coal requires an additional
marginal CCS cost which is decreasing in the cumulative clean coal consumption to justify
learning-by-doing. We show the following results. The clean coal exploitation must begin
at the earliest once the carbon cap is reached. Moreover, the energy price path can evolve
non-monotonically over time. When the solar cost is low enough, this last case can give rise
to an unusual sequence of energy consumption along which the solar energy consumption
is interrupted for some time and replaced by the clean coal exploitation.
The paper is organized as follows. Section 2 presents the model. Section 3 introduces
the optimal program of the social planner and derives the first-order conditions. Section 4
describes the typical optimal paths by distinguishing different scenarios for the solar energy
depending upon its relative cost as compared with the clean coal exploitation. Finally, we
conclude in Section 5 by discussing in particular the main qualitative dynamical properties
of the carbon tax required to enforce the carbon cap constraint.
2 The Model
We consider an economy in which the energy services can be supplied by two primary re-
sources, a potentially carbon-emitting non-renewable resource (coal) and a clean renewable
resource (solar). These energy sources are assumed to be perfect substitutes for the final
users.
Polluting non-renewable resource
Let X(t) be the available stock of coal at time t, X0 be the initial endowment, with
X(0) ≡ X0 > 0, and x(t) the instantaneous extraction rate so that:
X˙(t) = −x(t), X(t) ≥ 0 (1)
x(t) ≥ 0. (2)
The average delivery cost of coal, denoted by cx, is assumed to be constant, hence
equal to the marginal cost. This cost includes all the costs that must be incurred to supply
ready-for-use energy services to the final users, that is the extraction cost, the cost of
industrial processing and the transportation cost.
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Burning and consuming coal generates some carbon emissions that are proportional to
its use. Let ζ be the unitary pollutant content of coal so that, without any abatement
policy, the pollution flow which would be released into the atmosphere amounts to ζx(t).
However, the effective flow of carbon emissions can be lower than this potential pollution
flow thanks to the carbon capture and sequestration option.
Clean versus dirty energy services
Instead of expressing the CCS control variable by the share of the potential emission
flow which is captured, we proceed formally otherwise by considering in fact two types of
fossil energies allowing to produce final energy services together with the clean renewable
substitute. We define the clean coal as the part of the coal consumption whose emissions
are captured and the dirty coal as the other part whose emissions are directly released into
the atmosphere. Denoting respectively by xc(t) and xd(t) the instantaneous consumption
rates of clean and dirty coals, with xc(t) + xd(t) = x(t), (1) and (2) have to be rewritten
as:
X˙(t) = − [xc(t) + xd(t)] , X(t) ≥ 0 (3)
xc(t) ≥ 0 and xd(t) ≥ 0. (4)
Let S(t) be the cumulative clean coal consumption from time 0 up to time t. Assuming
that S(0) = 0 for the sake of simplicity, we thus have:
S(t) =
∫ t
0
xc(τ)dτ and S˙(t) = xc(t). (5)
CCS cost and learning-by-doing
Producing energy services from clean coal is costlier than from dirty coal since an additional
CCS cost must be incurred. Let cs be this additional cost, per unit of clean coal, so that the
average cost of the clean fossil energy amounts to cx + cs. We assume that this additional
cost depends on the cumulative clean coal consumption S and that the larger S, the larger
the cumulative experience in carbon capture and sequestration, hence the lower the average
additional cost cs. The objective of the paper being to isolate a pure learning effect,
we neglect any possible locking of the learning experience by reservoir limited capacity
constraints, even if such constraints are most probably empirically relevant.4 Thus the type
4Due to the scarcity of the most accessible sites into which the carbon can be sequestered, the average
CCS cost should also increase with S up to possibly some upper bound S¯ corresponding to the global
capacity of the geological carbon sinks. This is the type of stock effect that is thoroughly examined in
Lafforgue et al. (2008-a and 2008-b). In case of multiple carbon sinks, they show that the different
reservoirs must be filled by increasing order of their respective sequestration costs.
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of CCS cost functions is such that cs : [0, X
0]→ R+ is a C2 function, strictly decreasing and
strictly convex, c′s(S) < 0 and c′′s(S) > 0 for any S ∈ (0, X0), with limS↓0 cs(S) ≡ c¯s <∞
and cs(X
0) ≡ cs > 0.
Atmospheric pollution stock
Let Z(t) be the level of the atmospheric carbon concentration at time t, and Z0 the initial
concentration inherited from the past: Z(0) ≡ Z0 ≥ 0. This pollution stock is assumed to
be self-regenerating at a constant proportional rate α, α > 0.5 Since only the dirty coal
feeds the atmospheric carbon stock, the dynamics of Z is:
Z˙(t) = ζxd(t)− αZ(t). (6)
Pollution damages
We assume that, as far as the atmospheric pollution stock does not overshoot some critical
level Z¯, the damages due to the atmospheric carbon accumulation are negligible. However,
for pollution stocks that are larger than Z¯, the damages would be immeasurably larger
than the sum of the discounted gross surplus generated along any path triggering this
overshoot.6 By doing that, we assume a lexicographic structure of the preferences over
the set of the time paths of energy consumption and pollution stock. Technically, this
lexicographic structure translates into two constraints, the first one on the pollution stock
Z and the second one on the pollution flow ζxd.
Since the overshoot of this critical cap would destroy all that could be gained otherwise,
then we must impose:
Z¯ − Z(t) ≥ 0 and Z¯ − Z0 > 0. (7)
An implication of this constraint is that, when the ceiling is reached, the maximum quantity
of dirty coal which can be consumed is the exact quantity whose emissions are balanced by
the natural regeneration of the atmosphere. Denoting by x¯d this maximum consumption
rate of dirty coal, (6) implies that x¯d = αZ¯/ζ.
5Similar developments would be obtained under a self-regeneration marginal rate which is positive but
decreasing with Z. As pointed out in Toman and Withagen (2000), more difficult problems have to be
solved when the marginal rate is first positive and next negative, due to inherent non-convexity.
6See Amigues et al. (2011) for a model in which the both types of effects  small and drastic damages
 are explicitly taken into account, showing that the main qualitative properties of the optimal policy of
the pure ceiling model are preserved.
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Clean renewable primary resource
The other primary resource, clean and renewable, can be processed at a constant average
cost cy. As for the non-renewable resource this cost includes all the costs that must be
incurred to supply ready-for-use energy services to the final users. We denote by yn the
constant natural flow of solar energy and by y(t) the solar energy consumption at time t,
with the usual non-negativity constraint:
y(t) ≥ 0. (8)
We assume that yn is sufficiently large to provide all the energy needs of the society at the
marginal cost cy so that no rent has ever to be charged for an efficient exploitation of this
resource. Last, we assume that cy is larger than cx to justify the use of coal during some
initial period. Since relaxing the ceiling constraint can be achieved by using either clean
coal or solar energy, the relative competitiveness of these two options may depend upon
their respective costs. That is why we will distinguish the cases of a high or a low solar
energy cost in the following analysis. What we mean by high or low will be explicitly
precised in the next section.
Gross surplus generated by energy consumption
Clean coal, dirty coal and solar energy being assumed to be perfect substitutes, we define
the aggregate energy consumption as q(t) = xc(t)+xd(t)+y(t). This consumption generates
an instantaneous gross surplus u(q). The function u(·) is assumed to satisfy the following
standard assumptions: u : R+ → R is a C2 function, strictly increasing and strictly
concave verifying the Inada condition: limq↓0 u′(q) = +∞.
We denote by p(q) the marginal gross surplus function u′(q), and by q(p) its inverse, i.e.
the energy demand function. When the solar energy is the unique energy source, then its
optimal consumption amounts to y˜ solution of u′(y˜) = cy, provided that yn is not smaller
than y˜, what we mean by assuming that yn is sufficiently large.
3 The social planner program
The social planner problem consists in determining the path {(xc(t), xd(t), y(t)), t ≥ 0} that
maximizes the sum of the discounted net surplus while keeping away the catastrophic events
that would be triggered by a too high pollution stock. Denoting by ρ the instantaneous
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social discount rate (constant and positive), the corresponding program writes:7
max
xc,xd,y
∫ ∞
0
{u(xc + xd + y)− cx[xc + xd]− cs(S)xc − cyy} e−ptdt
subject to the state equations (3), (5) and (6), and to the inequality constraints (4), (7)
and (8). Let λS , λX and −λZ be the co-state variables of S, X and Z respectively,8 by ν's
the Lagrange multipliers associated with the inequality constraints on the state variables
and by γ's those corresponding to the inequality constraints on the control variables, hence
the current valued Hamiltonian, H, and Lagrangian, L:
H = u(xc + xd + y)− cx[xc + xd]− cs(S)xc − cyy − λX [xc + xd]− λZ [ζxd − αZ] + λSxc
L = H+ νXX + νZ [Z¯ − Z] + γcxc + γdxd + γyy.
The first order conditions are:
∂L
∂xc
= 0 ⇒ u′(xc + xd + y) = cx + λX + cs(S)− λS − γc (9)
∂L
∂xd
= 0 ⇒ u′(xc + xd + y) = cx + λX + ζλZ − γd (10)
∂L
∂y
= 0 ⇒ u′(xc + xd + y) = cy − γy (11)
λ˙S = ρλS − ∂L
∂S
⇒ λ˙S = ρλS + c′s(S)xc (12)
λ˙X = ρλX − ∂L
∂X
⇒ λ˙X = ρλX − νX (13)
λ˙Z = ρλZ +
∂L
∂Z
⇒ λ˙Z = (ρ+ α)λZ − νZ (14)
together with the usual complementary slackness conditions and the following transversal-
ity conditions:
lim
t↑∞
e−ρtλS(t)S(t) = 0 (15)
lim
t↑∞
e−ρtλX(t)X(t) = 0 (16)
lim
t↑∞
e−ρtλZ(t)Z(t) = 0. (17)
As it is well known, with a constant marginal extraction cost, the mining rent λX must
grow at the social rate of discount as long as the stock of coal is not exhausted. Denoting
by t¯X the time at which exhaustion occurs, we must have:
t < t¯X ⇒ λX(t) = λX0eρt, with λX0 ≡ λX(0).
7We drop the time index for notational convenience as far as possible.
8Using −λZ as the co-state variable of Z, we can directly interpret λZ ≥ 0 as the unitary tax on the
pollution emissions generated by dirty oil consumption.
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Hence from the transversality condition (16), if coal have some positive initial value, λX0 >
0, then it must be exhausted along the optimal path.
Initially, νZ is nil as long as the ceiling constraint is not binding yet. Denoting by tZ
the time at which the atmospheric carbon cap Z¯ is reached, (14) implies:
t ≤ tZ ⇒ λZ(t) = λZ0e(ρ+α)t, with λZ0 ≡ λZ(0).
Once the ceiling constraint is no longer active, λZ must be nil. Denoting by t¯Z the time
at which this constraint ceases to be active, it comes:
t ≥ t¯Z ⇒ λZ(t) = 0.
Last, denoting respectively by tc and by t¯c the date at which the clean coal production
begins and the date at which it ceases, (12) implies:
t ≤ tc ⇒ λS(t) = λS0eρt, with λS0 ≡ λS(0).
A common component of the costs of the two types of coal is the processing cost cx
augmented by the mining rent λX . We denote by p
F (F for free of tax and free of cleaning
cost) this common component:
pF (t) = cx + λX0e
ρt ⇒ p˙F (t) = ρλX0eρt > 0. (18)
In addition to this common component, the full marginal cost of the dirty coal, which
is denoted by cdm(xd), must also include the imputed social marginal cost of the carbon
emissions generated by its consumption:
cdm(xd) = p
F (t) + ζλZ(t). (19)
The full marginal cost ccm(xc) of the clean coal must include the marginal abatement cost
cs(Sc) reduced by the marginal value of a larger cumulative clean coal production λS :
ccm(xc) = p
F (t) + cs(S)− λS(t). (20)
As we shall see, λS is positive and it can be interpreted as a unitary subsidy on clean coal
consumption, owing to the learning-by-doing process on CCS technology.
The dynamics of exploitation of the two types of coal and of the solar energy are driven
by their respective instantaneous full marginal costs. Given that we assume a constant
marginal cost of the solar energy, we may organize the discussion depending on whether
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this marginal cost is high or low relatively to the other carbon-free option, i.e. the
clean coal. As it will be identified later, this technically amounts to compare cy with the
marginal gross surplus u′(x¯d) obtained when only dirty coal is consumed at the ceiling
and the two possible scenarios are either cy > u
′(x¯d) or cy < u′(x¯d). For the problem be
meaningful, we also assume that the initial coal endowment X0 is large enough to ensure
that the ceiling constraint (7) binds in finite time along the optimal path.
4 The qualitative properties of the optimal paths
We first determine the general properties of the optimal paths. We restrict the analysis
to the cases where clean coal has to be exploited along these optimal paths. We show
that the exploitation of the clean coal and of the solar energy may never begin before the
ceiling constraint is active and that the exploitation of these two carbon-free energy sources
may never be done simultaneous. Next we consider successively the cases of a high and a
low solar energy cost. In both cases, it may happen that the energy price increases non-
monotonically through time if the effect of learning-by-doing is strong enough. Moreover,
in the case of a low solar cost, it can be optimal to consume solar energy during two
disconnected time intervals.
4.1 General properties of the optimal paths
Thanks to learning from cumulative experience, the more the clean coal is presently used,
the lower its future marginal abatement cost. This suggests that λS  which captures the
positive externality of the clean coal production upon its future additional costs  must
be positive. However this positive externality has to be taken into account as far as clean
coal is consumed in the future. Once the clean coal exploitation definitively ceases, this
externality trivially disappears.
Proposition 1 The co-state variable associated with the cumulative clean coal consump-
tion is positive as far as its exploitation runs and nil thereafter:
λS(t)
{
> 0, for t < t¯c
= 0, for t¯c ≤ t.
(21)
Proof: Solving the differential equation (12) results in λS =
[
λS0 +
∫ t
0 c
′
s(S)xce
−ρτdτ
]
eρt,
where λS0 = −
∫∞
0 c
′
s(S)xce
−ρtdt from the transversality condition (15). Substituting for
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λS0 we obtain:
λS(t) = −
∫ ∞
t
c′s(S)xce
−ρ(τ−t)dτ, (22)
which is strictly positive as long as
∫∞
t xcdτ > 0, that is as long as t < t¯c.
Integrating by parts (22) we get the following alternative expression of λS which will
turn out to be useful in the proofs of Propositions 2, 3 and 4:
λS(t) = cs(S)− ρ
∫ ∞
t
cs(S)e
−ρ(τ−t)dτ. (23)
The following Propositions 2 and 3 show that the exploitation of the clean coal cannot
begin before the ceiling constraint is binding, i.e. before time tZ , and it must be closed
before the end of the ceiling period, i.e. before time t¯Z . However, as we shall see later (cf.
sections 4.2 and 4.3), it can be optimal to begin the clean coal exploitation strictly after
the time at which the ceiling is attained.
Proposition 2 The clean coal exploitation may not begin before the ceiling constraint is
binding: tc ≥ tZ .
Proof: Assume that the clean cost is exploited while the ceiling constraint is not binding
yet: tc < tZ . Then: i) Either only the clean coal is used during the time interval (tc, tZ);
ii) or there exists a sub-interval (t′c, t′Z), tc ≤ t′c < t′Z ≤ tZ , during which both the clean
and the dirty coals are simultaneously exploited; iii) or there exists a sub-interval (t′′c , t′′Z),
tc ≤ t′′c < t′′Z ≤ tZ , during which the clean coal and the solar energy are simultaneously
exploited.
i) Assume first that only the clean coal is consumed during the interval (tc, tZ), then
from Z(tc) < Z¯ and Z˙(t) = −αZ(t) < 0 for t ∈ (tc, tZ), we conclude that Z(tZ) < Z¯, a
contradiction.
ii) Assume next that both the dirty and the clean coals are exploited during some
interval (t′c, t′Z). Equating their respective full marginal costs results in ζλZ0e
(ρ+α)t =
cs(S)− λS(t), t ∈ (t′c, t′Z). Substituting the R.H.S. of (23) for λS , we get:
ζλZ0e
(ρ+α)t = ρ
∫ ∞
t
cs(S)e
−ρ(τ−t)dτ. (24)
Time differentiating (24) yields to ζ(ρ+ α)λZ0e
(ρ+α)t = −ρcs(S) + ρ2
∫∞
t cs(S)e
−ρ(τ−t)dτ
and, using (24) again, we finally get:
0 < ζαλZ0e
(ρ+α)t = −ρcs(S) < 0, t ∈ [t′c, t′Z ],
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a contradiction.
iii) Last we show in Proposition 4 that clean coal and solar energy may never be
exploited simultaneously.
Proposition 3 Clean coal exploitation must cease before the end of the ceiling period:
t¯c ≤ t¯Z .
Proof: Assume that at t¯Z , both types of coal are still used, that is xc(t¯Z) > 0 and
xd(t¯Z) = x¯d. Equating their full marginal costs and taking into account that λZ(t¯Z) = 0,
we get pF (t¯Z) = p
F (t¯Z) + cs(S(t¯Z)) − λS(t¯Z). Substituting the R.H.S. of (23) for λS(t¯Z)
results in:
pF (t¯Z) = p
F (t¯Z) + ρ
∫ ∞
t¯Z
cs(S)e
−ρ(τ−t)dτ > pF (t¯Z),
a contradiction.
Proposition 4 The clean coal and the solar energy may never be exploited simultaneously.
Proof: Assume that the clean coal and the solar energy are simultaneously used during
some interval (t1, t2). Equating their full marginal costs yields cy = cx + λX0e
ρt + cs(S)−
λS(t), t ∈ (t1, t2). Substituting the R.H.S. of (23) for λS , we get:
cy − cx = λX0eρt + ρ
∫ ∞
t
cs(S)e
−ρ(τ−t)dτ. (25)
Time differentiating, we obtain: 0 = ρ
[
λX0e
ρt − cs(S)
]
+ ρ2
∫∞
t cs(S)e
−ρ(τ−t)dτ and, tak-
ing (25) into account: 0 = ρ[cy − cx] − ρcs(S). Time differentiating again, we finally
get:
0 = −ρc′s(S)xc(t) > 0, t ∈ (t1, t2)
a contradiction.
From Propositions 2, 3 and 4 we conclude that, if it is optimal to use clean coal, its
exploitation must occur during some time interval (tc, t¯c) strictly included within the ceiling
period (tZ , t¯Z). During this interval the both types of coal are used, q(t) = xc(t) + x¯d, so
that from (9):
u′(xc(t) + x¯d) = pF (t) + cs(S)− λS(t).
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Time differentiating and substituting the R.H.S. of (12) for λ˙S results in:
x˙c(t) =
ρ[λX0e
ρt − λS(t)]
u′′(xc(t) + x¯d)
. (26)
Hence x˙c(t) may be of either sign, positive of negative. However we can show that xc, and
consequently also p, can follow only two types of paths.
Remark that, from (21), λS tends towards 0 at the end of the clean coal exploitation
period. Thus, since λS is necessarily continuous in such a deterministic model, there must
exist some terminal sub-interval (t¯c −∆, t¯c), 0 < ∆ ≤ t¯c − tc, during which x˙c is negative
and the energy price p is increasing. We have now to determine what could happen at the
beginning of the clean coal consumption period when this terminal sub-interval is strictly
shorter than the entire phase, that is when ∆ < t¯c − tc. Proposition 5 below states that
the sign of x˙c may change at most only once within the interval.
Proposition 5 During a phase of simultaneous exploitation of clean and dirty coal at the
ceiling, the energy price is either monotonically increasing, or first decreasing and next
increasing. Equivalently, the clean coal production is either monotonically decreasing or
first increasing and next decreasing.
Proof: Assume that limt↓tc x˙c(t) > 0. Define t0 as the first date at which x˙c(t) alternates in
sign since, in this case, the sign is changing at least once: t0 = inf {t : x˙c(t) ≤ 0, t ∈ [tc, t¯c)}
implying x˙c(t0) = 0. From (26), we have:
u′′(xc(t) + x¯d)x˙c(t) = ρ[λX0eρt − λS(t)].
Defining φ(t) ≡ λX0eρt − λS(t), the concavity of u(.)0 implies:
x˙c(t) > / = / < 0 ⇔ φ(t) < / = / > 0.
Time differentiating φ(t) and using (12), we get: φ˙(t) = ρφ(t) − c′s(S)xc(t). Integrating
over [t0, t], t0 < t ≤ t¯c, and taking into account that φ(t0) = 0, we obtain:
φ(t) = −eρt
∫ t
t0
c′s(S)xce
−ρτdτ > 0, t ∈ (t0, t¯c].
We conclude that, if the sign of φ˙, hence the sign of x˙c and p˙, is changing over [tc, t¯c), it is
only once.
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The next Proposition 6 shows that the shadow marginal value λS of the learning in
abatement is decreasing when the clean coal production is also decreasing. Define (t′c, t¯c),
t′c < t¯c, as the maximum time interval during which xc is decreasing, then:
Proposition 6 λS is decreasing over the time interval (t
′
c, t¯c).
Proof: Let ti and ti+1, t
′
c ≤ ti < ti+1 < t¯c, be two successive dates at which the sign of
λS alternates. Since λ˙S = 0 at these dates, we get from (12):
ζλS(th) = −c′s(S(th))xc(th), h = i, i+ 1.
Because S(ti+1) > S(ti) and c
′′
s > 0, then −c′s(S(ti)) > −c′s(S(ti+1)) which, together with
xc(ti) > xc(ti+1), implies that λS(ti) > λS(ti+1). Thus λS(ti) is a local maximum while
λS(ti+1) is a local minimum.
Let tj and tj+1, tj < tj+1 < t¯c, be the two last successive dates at which λS attains
a maximum followed by a minimum before t¯c. Since limt↑t¯c λS(t) = 0, there must exist a
third date tj+2, tj+1 < tj+2 < t¯c, at which λS attains a local maximum, so that λS(tj+1) <
λS(tj+2), which is in contradiction with the above result.
However, whatever the type of path followed by the energy price during the period
at the ceiling, there exists one and only one type of path of the shadow cost λZ of the
pollution stock during this period.
Proposition 7 During the period at the ceiling, the shadow marginal cost of the pollution
stock λZ must be decreasing.
Proof: Assume first that the both types of coal are exploited. Using the clean coal option
implies that p(t) = pF (t) + cs(S)−λS(t). Time differentiating and substituting the R.H.S.
of (12) for λ˙S results in:
p˙(t) = p˙F (t) + c′s(S)xc(t)− λ˙S(t) = p˙F (t)− ζλS(t). (27)
Since the dirty coal is exploited simultaneously, then we must also have p(t) = pF (t) +
ζλZ(t). Time differentiating and taking (27) into account, we get p˙(t) = p˙
F (t) + ζλ˙Z(t) =
p˙F (t)− ζλS(t), hence:
λ˙Z(t) = −ρ
ζ
λS(t) < 0.
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Assume now that both the dirty coal and the solar energy are exploited at the same
time, then: p(t) = pF (t) + ζλZ(t) = cy. Time differentiating and using (18) implies:
p˙F (t) + ζλ˙Z(t) = ζλX0e
ρt + ζλ˙Z(t) ⇔ λ˙Z(t) = −ρ
ζ
λX0e
ρt < 0.
Finally, assume that only the dirty coal is exploited, then: p(t) = u′(x¯d) = pF (t) +
ζλZ(t). Hence according to (18):
λ˙Z(t) = −1
ζ
p˙F (t) = −ρ
ζ
λX0e
ρt < 0.
Although λ˙Z is not necessarily continuous, λZ is continuous, which concludes the proof.
The last common characteristics shared by all the possible optimal paths concerns their
respective behavior during the pre-ceiling phase, i.e. before the ceiling constraint begins
to be active. From Proposition 2, we know that this phase must also occur before the
beginning of the clean coal exploitation, that is over the time interval [0, tZ ] ⊆ [0, tc].
During this initial phase the full marginal cost of the clean coal option amounts to:
ccm = cx + c¯s + (λX0 − λS0)eρt,
which may be either increasing or decreasing depending on whether the initial shadow
marginal cost of coal λX0 is larger or smaller than the initial shadow marginal value λS0 of
the cumulative experience in abatement. Such a formulation could prove to be paradoxical
since no experience has been accumulated yet. But λS0 must be read as the marginal value
of a zero-experience and this marginal value may be very high.
The sign of λX0 − λS0, which is endogenous, determines the position of the phase of
a simultaneous exploitation of clean and dirty coals in the optimal sequence of phases.
However these types of optimal sequences depend upon whether the solar energy cost is
high or low.
4.2 The high solar cost case: cy > u
′(x¯d)
In the high solar cost case, since cy > u
′(x¯d), solar energy is necessarily used after the
period at the ceiling. Hence, the argument that determines the different possible types of
scenarios is the scarcity of coal, which is measured by λX0, relative to the shadow marginal
value of the learning in sequestration, λS0.
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High marginal shadow cost of coal: λX0 > λS0
Since λX0 > λS0, the clean coal exploitation must begin precisely at the time at which
the pollution cap Z¯ is attained: tc = tZ . This case is illustrated in Figure 1. At the
intersection of the trajectories pF (t) + c¯s − λS0eρt and pF (t) + ζλZ0e(ρ+α)t (remind that
pF (t) = cx + λX0e
ρt) either the common full marginal cost of coal is lower than u′(x¯d),
as illustrated in Figure 1, or it is higher (not depicted) so that the clean coal is never
competitive. Thus the unique possible optimal sequence of phases is the following: i) only
dirty coal up to the time at which the ceiling is attained and, simultaneously, the clean
coal becomes competitive, ii) both the dirty and clean coals at the ceiling, iii) only dirty
coal at the ceiling, iv) only dirty coal during a first post-ceiling phase, and v) the infinite
phase of solar energy use.
[Figure 1 here]
The other implication of λX0 > λS0 is that at time t
+
c , i.e. at the beginning of the
phase of a joint exploitation of the both types of coal, due to the continuity of λS(t), then:
λX0e
ρt+c − λS(t+c ) ' (λX0 − λS0)eρt
+
c > 0.
From (26), we conclude that x˙c(t
+
c ) < 0 and, from Proposition 5, that x˙c(t) < 0 for all
t ∈ [t+c , t¯c). As a result, the energy price is increasing during this phase.
Low marginal shadow cost of coal: λX0 < λS0
In this case, the marginal value of the CCS experience is higher than the scarcity rent
of coal. This gives rise to some new types of optimal paths, not only because what is
happening during the phase of a joint exploitation of the both types of coal is different,
but also because the position of this phase within the optimal sequence of phases may be
different.
Figure 2 illustrates why the time profiles of the energy price and of the energy con-
sumption are different during the phase of joint exploitation although the optimal sequence
of phases is the same as the sequence of the previous case where λX0 > λS0.
[Figure 2 here]
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Since (λX0−λS0)eρtc < 0, then at the beginning of the joint exploitation phase we may
have λX0e
ρt+c − λS(t+c ) < 0 so that x˙(t+c ) > 0. From Proposition 5 we know that, in this
case, the energy price must be first decreasing and next increasing as illustrated in Figure
2, thus implying an unusual increase in the total coal consumption once the pollution cap
is attained to capitalize on the learning effects.
Finally, a last case has to be considered. In Figure 3, the optimal sequence of phases
is modified in the following terms. The clean coal begins to be competitive after the
beginning of the period at the ceiling so that tc no longer coincides with tZ . Consequently,
the phase of joint exploitation of the both types of coal still occurs during the ceiling
period, but it is now flanked by two phases of exclusive dirty coal use: tZ < tc < t¯c < t¯Z .
Contrary to the previous cases, the exploitation of the clean coal begins here smoothly:
limt↓tc xc(t) = 0. Hence, there is not an abrupt change anymore in dirty coal consumption
at time tc, contrary to the case where tc = tZ , as illustrated in Figure 2 for instance.
[Figure 3 here]
Analysis
In the high solar cost case, solar energy is never competitive before the depletion of the coal
energy source. The optimal timing and scale of the clean coal option thus depends only
on the relative competitiveness of the dirty and clean coal options. Proposition 2 states
that the cleaning option is never competitive before the economy is constrained by the
atmospheric carbon ceiling, irrespective of the importance of future learning opportunities.
It shows that an early introduction of the cleaning option, that is before tZ , is always
dominated by a reduction in the use of dirty coal allowing to delay the attainment of the
ceiling.
However, this does not mean that the cleaning option has to be introduced right from
the beginning of the ceiling phase. u′(x¯d) gives a measure of the opportunity cost of the
pollution constraint during the ceiling period. This cost has to be balanced with the highest
opportunity cost of clean coal energy generation given by pF (t) + c¯s − λS(t). This cost
increases over time with a high shadow marginal cost of coal, implying an introduction
of the cleaning option right from tZ . It decreases over time with a low shadow marginal
cost of coal resulting into two possibilities at the beginning of the ceiling phase. Either
it is lower than u′(x¯d), the opportunity cost of the constraint on dirty coal production,
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in which case the cleaning option has to be introduced immediately when attaining the
ceiling. Or it is higher than u′(x¯d) at tZ and abatement should be introduced only after
some time period at the ceiling with only dirty coal burning before that time when the two
opportunity costs are equalized.
As we are going to examine now, in the low solar cost case, clean coal will be in
competition not only with dirty coal but also with the carbon-free solar energy, thus
resulting in new optimal scenarios of energy consumption.
4.3 The low solar cost case: cy < u
′(x¯d)
Since cy < u
′(x¯d) then, during the ceiling period, dirty coal is necessarily used together
with either solar energy or clean coal. Concerning the solar energy, the problem is to
determine whether its exploitation may begin before the pollution cap Z¯ is attained or
not. Proposition 8 shows that, like the clean coal exploitation, the exploitation of the solar
energy may not begin before the ceiling constraint is binding.
Proposition 8 The solar energy exploitation may not begin before the ceiling constraint
is binding: ty ≥ tZ .
Proof: The logic of the proof is the same as those developed for the clean coal in Propo-
sition 2. Assume that solar energy is used while the ceiling constraint is not binding
yet: ty < tZ . Then over the time interval (ty, tZ), only solar energy must be used since
pF (t) + ζλZ0e
(ρ+α)t > cy and clean coal may not be exploited according to Proposition 2.
Hence Z(t) decreases during the interval, implying Z(tZ) < Z¯, a contradiction.
As in the high solar cost case, various types of optimal paths are possible according to
whether the initial mining rent, λX0, is larger or smaller than the initial shadow marginal
value of learning, λS0.
High marginal shadow cost of coal: λX0 > λS0
According to the arguments developed in the previous subsections, the phase of joint
exploitation of the two types of coal must begin when the ceiling is attained and the
energy price must be increasing during this phase although the shadow marginal cost of
the pollution stock is decreasing, up to the time at which this price equals cy instead of
u′(x¯d) < cy, time at which the solar energy becomes competitive (see Figure 4). Then,
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according to Proposition 4, the exploitation of the clean coal must cease precisely at this
date. The production of solar energy thus substitutes for the production of clean coal while
staying at the ceiling up to the time at which pF (t) = cy. Then the dirty coal exploitation
is closed, the coal reserves must be exhausted and the solar energy supplies the totality of
the energy needs. Note that in this case, the total coal consumption shuts down tc = ty
when the solar energy becomes competitive.
[Figure 4 here]
Low marginal shadow cost of coal: λX0 < λS0
First, the period of joint exploitation of the two types of coal may precede the period
of competitiveness of the solar energy. The associated price and consumption paths are
illustrated in Figure 5.
[Figure 5 here]
However, as illustrated in Figure 6, the phase of competitiveness of the clean coal may
also take place once the solar energy is competitive, that is at a date at which the solar
energy is already used: ty = tZ < tc < t¯c < t¯Z . In this case, the exploitation of the solar
energy must be interrupted since the energy price falls down the trigger price cy during
the time interval [tc, t¯c] of joint exploitation of the both kinds of coal. At time t = t¯c, the
solar energy becomes competitive again and its production replaces the production of the
clean coal. Then, the dirty coal and the solar energy are simultaneously used, as in the
first phase of the ceiling period, up to the time t = t¯Z at which p
F (t) = cy and at which
the stock of coal is exhausted.
[Figure 6 here]
Analysis
In the low solar case, the energy price cannot be higher than cy, the (constant) marginal
cost of solar energy. When the shadow cost of coal is large, the highest opportunity cost
being permanently rising, either it is higher than cy at tZ , meaning that the CCS option
is irrelevant with respect to the cheaper solar alternative, either it is lower, and the CCS
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option eliminates temporarily the use of solar energy. Learning being presently unable to
prevent the continuous rise of the full marginal cost of clean coal, its exploitation ceases
after its full marginal cost becomes higher than the solar energy cost. In this scenario,
learning abilities only opens a transitory window for clean coal energy generation before
the introduction of carbon-free solar energy.
High learning opportunities with respect to coal scarcity opens new possibilities. As
in the high solar cost case, the highest opportunity cost of the cleaning option declines
before the introduction of clean coal. If it is lower than cy when the ceiling is attained,
the cleaning option eliminates, at least temporarily, the solar option. In the reverse case,
solar energy is introduced once the atmospheric carbon constraint begins to be binding,
but the continuous fall of the cleaning highest opportunity cost allows the cleaning option
to be introduced at the expense of the solar option after some time at the ceiling. However
the competitive advantage of clean coal can only be transitory because of coal depletion
and solar energy ultimately replace clean coal energy generation. In such scenarios, solar
energy is used first at the ceiling in combination with dirty coal energy waiting for the clean
coal option to become competitive. It appears once again when the competitive advantage
of clean coal has been sufficiently reduced by the increasing scarcity of fossil fuels.
5 Concluding remarks
We have shown that it is optimal to wait that the ceiling constraint be effective before
beginning to abate some part of the potential pollution flow when the instantaneous average
abatement cost is linear in the flow of sequestration, even if learning effects are at work
and, maybe more surprising, whatever strong these learning effects are: our results do
depend only upon the qualitative properties of the CCS cost function. Two main reasons
can explain this result. First, the abatement cost function can be broken up in the sense
of Uzawa (1965): C(S, xc) = c(S)xc. This implies constant returns to scale in abatement
technology and then, particular marginal effects. More precisely, whatever the learning
function, it is always the first unit of sequestration that is the costlier. From a discounting
argument, it is thus always optimal to start abatement as late as possible, that is once the
ceiling becomes really constraining for the economy. A more general decomposable form
such as C(S, xc) = C0(S)C1(xc), with C1(.) increasing and convex, would lead to different
results. Amigues et al (2013-b) show that with decreasing returns to scale but without
learning effect, it is optimal to deploy abatement before the ceiling is reached. A possible
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extension would be to extend this result by also considering learning-by-doing.
A second reason is that the learning function is assumed to be linear in our model:
S˙ = xc. A more general assumption would be to set S˙ = g(xc), with g(.) increasing. If we
assume in addition that g(.) is concave, thus reflecting decreasing returns in the learning
function, the smaller the abatement, the larger the marginal acquisition of experience. In
such a case, the intuition suggests that it would be optimal to start the learning as soon
as possible. Again, this argument constitutes a line for future research. Note that, in
all these possible extensions, the timing of CCS policies must be defined relatively to the
(endogenous) date at which the ceiling is reached. In the absolute, learning-by-doing has
also an effect on this date.
The optimal policy has to be supported by both a pollution tax upon the carbon
released into the atmosphere and by a subsidy to the clean coal alternative. The time
profile of the pollution tax rate λZ has the well know U inverted profile obtained in most
studies of the warming problem, along the lines pioneered by Ulph and Ulph (1994) and
Tahvonen (1997). This time profile is also the standard profile of the models with ceiling
constraints pioneered by Chakravorty et al. (2006) and the time profile of the mixed
model of Amigues et al. (2011) in which both small and catastrophic damages are taken
into account.
The time profile of the unitary subsidy to the clean coal production is first increasing
during the preliminary phase preceding the beginning of its production and decreasing
down to zero during the time interval at the ceiling within which its production decreases.
It is less easy to characterize during the phase of increasing clean coal production if such
a phase exists, the time path being not necessarily monotone.
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Figure 1: Optimal paths when cy > u
′(x¯d) and λX0 > λS0
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Figure 2: Optimal paths when cy > u
′(x¯d), λX0 < λS0 and tc = tZ
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Figure 3: Optimal paths when cy > u
′(x¯d), λX0 < λS0 and tc > tZ
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Figure 5: Optimal paths when cy < u
′(x¯d), λX0 < λS0 and tc = tZ
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Figure 6: Optimal paths when cy < u
′(x¯d), λX0 < λS0 and tc > tZ
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